The purpose of this paper is to examine the welfare effects of pollution abatement technology transfer in a two-good two-country model with transboundary pollution. In each country, one industry emits pollution as a joint product of output and the sum of domestic and cross-border pollution decreases productivity of the other industry. Then, we show that technology transfer can benefit the recipient country regardless of the level of crossborder pollution. Moreover, the donor country gains from technology transfer if all pollution is transboundary but it may harm the donor country without cross-border pollution. We demonstrate that the effects of technology transfer depend on the trade pattern as well as cross-border pollution.
Introduction
In recent years, there has been growing concern with the effects of economic development on the global environment. For example, we are concerned that a recent increase in green-house gases alters each country's climate and the change may negatively affect agricultural production (e.g., OECD Environmental Outlook, 2001). We recognize that each country should introduce environmental policy to resolve global environmental problems. This paper examines the effects of pollution abatement technology transfer in a two-good two-country model. In each country, a dirty industry emits pollution as a joint product of output and the sum of domestic and cross-border pollution decreases productivity of a clean industry.
The basic structure of our model is based on Copeland and Taylor (1999) , Benarroch We also explore how technology transfer affects each country's welfare and world welfare.
The analysis of pollution abatement technology transfer is important in the following sense.
In many countries, especially in developing countries, the government has difficulty in taking positive measures to deal with environmental degradation because of the lack of funds and pollution abatement technology for preservation and clean-up. Thus, the transfer of pollution abatement technology transfer may be a possible resolution to global environmental problems.
Moreover, the third Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP3) held in Kyoto in 1997 adopted, so-called, the Kyoto Protocol. The protocol includes an important agreement that the targets of reduction in green-house gases (GHGs) in developed countries were explicitly set. The Kyoto Protocol introduces the socalled 'Kyoto mechanisms' as an international system to promote to achieve such commitments.
One of the important Kyoto mechanisms is a clean development mechanism (CDM). It allows developed countries (Annex I Party) to acquire from developing countries (non-Annex I Party), as "certified reduction emissions", the emissions reduction resulting from emissions reduction projects in the developing countries. There has been a few studies on the effects of technology transfer on the environment. Buchholz and Konrad (1994) and Stranlund (1996) examined the global environmental problem by using a game-theoretic approach. They used a one-good model because their focus was on the strategic behavior of countries toward pollution abatement technology. Then, they cannot deal with the terms-of-trade effect on pollution which works in the present model. In other words, a one-good model cannot investigate the inter-industry interaction caused by pollution.
Thus, a change in pollution might be underestimated in their model.
There exist sharp differences on the welfare effects of technology transfer between Itoh and Tawada (2003) and the present paper although the basic structure of both models is based on Copeland and Taylor (1999) and technology transfer is the same type (i.e., technology transfer reduces the emission rate in the recipient country). Under local pollution, technology transfer never benefits the donor country in their model but technology transfer can enrich the donor country in the present model. More importantly, under cross-border pollution, Itoh and Tawada (2003) demonstrated that both the donor and the recipient is better off by the pollution abatement technology transfer but we derive that technology transfer may impoverish the recipient country as well as the donor country.
We explain that such contradiction arises because of differences in the terms-of-trade effect and international interaction caused by transboundary pollution. Since the trade pattern in each country is determined by the assumption on pollution in Itoh and Tawada (2003) , they cannot deal with some trade patterns which can be examined in this paper. In the present model, the terms-of-trade effect has impact opposite to their model. Since their analysis is limited to special trade patterns, they may have overestimated the terms-of-trade effect. International interaction caused by transboundary pollution is also important. In this paper, both the donor and the recipient produce the clean good and the polluting good. Then, there are interactions not only between the industries due to pollution externality but also between the countries through cross-border pollution. On the other hand, in Itoh and Tawada (2003) , at least one of the donor and the recipient completely specializes because their model behaves like the Ricardian model.
Because of this feature, pollution abatement technology transfer has no international interaction which works in the present model. Hence, they may have underestimated the impact of crossborder pollution. We show the conditions for welfare improvement by technology transfer in a model with incomplete specialization. This paper adds a new value to this field of research.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We develop a model in Section 2. We examine the effects of technology transfer on terms of trade and pollution in Section 3. Section 4 explores the welfare effects of technology transfer. Finally, we provide concluding remarks.
The Model
We develop a two-country general equilibrium model to investigate the welfare effects of the transfer of pollution abatement technology under cross-border pollution. Country α is the donor and country β is the recipient. In each country, there are two industries denoted M and A. Industry M is a dirty industry that emits pollution as a joint product of output.
Pollution generated by industry M degrades the natural environment useful to industry A and then decreases productivity of industry A. The markets of goods and factors of production are competitive in both countries. All goods are assumed to be produced in both countries.
Consider the production structure of the donor country. 2 
Under the presence of transboundary pollution, the total level of pollution, D α , affecting the donor country is given by
where We define the gross domestic product (GDP) function as follows:
where p and v α denote the world relative price of M and the factor endowment vector of the donor country, respectively. It is linearly homogeneous in p and m α (e.g., Helpman, 1984, p.334 ).
Let us define the following function:
where
. The value of R α (·) is the 'virtual' national income of the donor country since it denotes the national income under no production externality and the 'virtual' price, q α . We define the 'virtual' national income and price to describe equilibrium by utilizing the traditional GDP function. R α (·) behaves like the standard GDP function with constant returns to scale technologies.
By using the virtual national income, we can rewrite the GDP function as
It has the following property:
(see Appendix A). Henceforth, we delete the fixed factor endowment vector, i.e.,
information of pollution externality.
The equilibrium of the world economy is described by the system of equations: 3
where E j (p, u j ) is the expenditure function with the level of utility, u j (j = α, β). Equations (4) and (6) are the budget constraint of the donor and the recipient, respectively. Equations (5) and (7) indicate the endogenous level of pollution (i.e., domestic pollution plus transboundary pollution) in the donor and the recipient, respectively. Equation (8) is the market-clearing condition for the polluting good, M . The world market for A also clears by Walras' Law.
Terms of Trade and Global Pollution
In this section, we investigate the impact of pollution abatement technology transfer on terms of trade and pollution. They are essential to the welfare effects of technology transfer. If the donor country transfers pollution abatement technology to the recipient country, then the emission rate of the recipient country, λ β , decreases. We assume that pollution abatement technology is transferred without cost in order to highlight the impact of technology transfer. All goods are assumed to be normal in consumption in both countries, i.e., pE α pu > 0 and pE
First, we consider changes in the terms of trade. Totally differentiating equations (4)- (8) and choosing E j u ≡ 1, we obtain ∆ dp
where b ≡ b α = b β . 4 ∆ represents the Jacobian determinant of the system (4)- (8) . Under certain conditions on the interaction between the emission rate and pollution, ∆ is positive if the equilibrium is Walrasian stable (see Appendix B). We assume ∆ > 0 throughout this paper.
Equation (9) shows that pollution abatement technology transfer unambiguously increases the price of the polluting good. Note that this effect of technology transfer is independent of the marginal propensities to consume goods and the emission rate in each country. From Appendix B, 1+
Hence, the right hand side of equation (9) is negative. We derive this result regardless of the fraction of transboundary pollution.
Then, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The transfer of pollution abatement technology increases the price of the polluting good.
Technology transfer increases the price of the polluting good under incomplete specialization in both countries. On the other hand, if the recipient country produces the clean good only Second, we examine the effects of technology transfer on pollution affecting each country.
Intuitively, we expect that a decrease in the emission rate in country β reduces the amount of pollution in both countries if pollution is transboundary. However, technology transfer does not always have such impact.
Totally differentiating equations (4)- (8), we obtain
From equation (10), the impact of pollution abatement technology transfer on D α is ambiguous in general. We will consider two cases according to the fraction of cross-border pollution.
Under (exports) the polluting good and the marginal propensity to consume it in the recipient country is larger (smaller) than that in the donor country (i.e., (
We can explain the intuition of this result as follows. Technology transfer directly reduces transboundary pollution from the recipient to the donor under the fixed output of the polluting good in the recipient. On the other hand, since technology transfer increases the price of the polluting good (Proposition 1), it indirectly has a negative impact on the environment in the donor country through an increase in the output of the polluting good in both countries. However, the former impact of cross-border pollution dominates the later effect when all pollution is 5 We can derive a similar result if we assume λ α = 0 instead of b = 1. 6 Since there are differences in the emission rate, production technologies, and preference between the donor and the recipient, various trade patterns can take place in the present model. 
This analysis has important implication for resolution of the global warming problem by utilizing CDM. In the present model, we can interpret pollution as GHGs. The donor country has an incentive to transfer pollution abatement technology to acquire "certified reduction emissions" if the transfer can decrease the sum of each country's emission. It is straightforward from Proposition 2 that technology transfer necessarily decreases the sum of each country's pollution 
Welfare Effects of Technology Transfer

The donor country
We examine the welfare effect of pollution abatement technology transfer in the donor country.
It is convenient for considering two cases according to the fraction of cross-border pollution.
First, we explore the case of no transboundary pollution (b = 0). Under b = 0, equation (13) is rewritten as
We show that the donor country suffers from technology transfer when it imports the polluting good (E α p − R α q ≥ 0). 7 On the other hand, the effect of pollution abatement technology transfer is ambiguous if the donor country exports the polluting good (E α p − R α q < 0). Especially, technology transfer enriches the donor country if there is no domestic pollution in the donor country (λ α = 0). We derive D α = 0, m α = 0, and m α = 0 if λ α = 0. Then, the right hand side of equation (14) is negative.
Proposition 3. Suppose that there is no transboundary pollution. Then, (i) technology transfer harms the donor country if the donor country imports the polluting good but (ii) the donor country benefits from technology transfer if the donor country exports the polluting good and does not emit pollution.
The result can be explained as follows. Technology transfer increases the relative price of the polluting good (Proposition 1). Moreover, technology transfer increases the domestic pollution in the donor country (Proposition 2), which will cause productivity losses. Both the former and the latter effects deteriorates welfare because the price change is deterioration in terms of trade
On the other hand, in the case of E α p − R α q < 0, the price change implies improvement in terms of trade. The smaller λ α is the smaller productivity losses are. Then, the terms-of-trade effect can outweigh productivity losses if λ α is near zero. 7 Recall that the recipient country is assumed to produce the polluting good (R β q > 0). Otherwise, technology transfer has no effect on welfare. On the other hand, we consider the case in which the donor country exports the polluting good (E α p − R α q < 0). Then, the donor country benefits from technology transfer if all pollution is transboundary (b = 1) or the donor country does not emit pollution (λ α = 0). The signs of the first and the last two terms of equation (13) are negative. In the second term, we already know that M 1 − bM 2 is zero under b = 1 or λ α = 0. Hence, the right hand side of equation (13) is negative.
Summing up, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose that there is cross-border pollution. Then, (i) in the case in which the donor country imports the polluting good, technology transfer can harm the donor country if the fraction of transboundary pollution between the countries is sufficiently small. (ii) In the case in which the donor country exports the polluting good, technology transfer enriches the donor country if (a) all pollution is transboundary or (b) the donor country does not emit pollution.
Intuition of the result is the following. A decrease in pollution affecting the donor country is 
The recipient country
We will consider two cases according to the trade pattern in order to clarify the impact of technology transfer.
First, we examine the case in which the recipient country exports the polluting good (E Second, let us assume that the recipient country imports the polluting good (E
We can rewrite equation (15) as
The welfare effect of technology transfer is ambiguous in general. Technology transfer can enrich or harm the recipient country. We know that the third and the forth terms in the right hand side are positive but the other terms are negative. Then, the right hand side of equation (16) may be positive.
Proposition 5. Technology transfer enriches the recipient country if the recipient country exports the polluting good but technology transfer may harm the recipient country if the recipient country imports the polluting good, regardless of the fraction of transboudary pollution.
We can explain the intuition of the result as follows. In the case in which the recipient country exports the polluting good, the terms-of-trade effect is in favor of the recipient country 
The world welfare
We investigate the effect of technology transfer on the world welfare, i.e., the sum of the two countries' welfare. From equations (13) and (15), we derive
It is convenient for considering two cases according to the fraction of cross-border pollution and the emission rate.
First, we examine the case in which all pollution is transboundary (b = 1). Technology transfer improves the world welfare if the donor country imports the polluting good (E α p − R α q > 0) and the marginal propensity to consume the polluting good in the donor country is sufficiently larger than that in the recipient country. Recall that M 1 − bM 2 is zero under b = 1.
pu in the third right hand side term is negative if E α pu is sufficiently larger than E β pu . Thus, the right hand side of equation (17) is negative under the conditions. (17) is negative under the conditions. The reason is similar to the above case.
Proposition 6. Suppose that the donor country imports the polluting good and the marginal propensity to consume the polluting good in the donor country is sufficiently larger than that in the recipient country. Then, technology transfer improves the world welfare if (i) all pollution is transboundary or (ii) the donor country does not emit pollution.
We will compare the results of this paper with the existing literature. There exist sharp differences on the welfare effects of technology transfer between Itoh and Tawada (2003) and the present paper although the basic structure of both models is based on Copeland and Taylor However, we derive that technology transfer may impoverish the recipient country as well as the donor country. These differences imply that they may have underestimated the effects of technology transfer.
We can consider that such inconsistency arises because of three factors. The first factor is asymmetry of the present model. Itoh and Tawada 
Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the effects of pollution abatement technology transfer in a two-good twocountry model. In each country, a dirty industry emits pollution as a joint product of output and the sum of domestic and cross-border pollution decreases productivity of a clean industry. We show a possibility of voluntary introduction of pollution abatement technology. A country is likely to adopt advanced pollution abatement technology to reduce pollution if it exports the polluting good. The reason is that introduction of the advanced technology improves terms of trade. This theoretical result implies that a country which produces a large amount of the polluting good to export it, which may be a developed country, tends to introduce the pollutionreducing technology voluntarily.
This paper focuses on the inter-industry and international interaction caused by pollution.
We may obtain general results if we describe the cost function of technology transfer explicitly.
One possible extension is to develop a new model to consider the strategic behavior of countries toward pollution abatement technology.
Appendix A
In this Appendix, we consider the relationship between G α (p, m α , v α ) and R α (q α , v α ). Since the GDP function, G α (·), is linearly homogeneous in p and m α , it can be rewritten as follows:
From the properties of the GDP function, we have G α p = Q α M (e.g., Helpman, 1984) . Thus,
we deriveṗ = (−∆J −1 )dp where J ≡ 1 + 
